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27 
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: JUSTICE POWELL AND JUSTICE 






The jurisprudence of a Supreme Court Justice is one of eclectic tides.  Various 
experiences impact a justice’s interpretation and application of precedent.  Even 
though the black robe symbolizes impartiality, experience colors judicial opinions.  
Experience shapes the lens from which we view the world and it also shapes how 
judges determine what the law is.1  Complex in its composition, jurisprudence 
embodies the obscurity of individual experience, review of precedent and 
interpretation of statutes. 
This Note will examine how Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s individual experiences affected their jurisprudence concerning 
educational issues.  Part I will provide a brief biography of each Justice, relaying 
the experiences that shed light on their education perspective.  Even though they 
were both southerners who served simultaneously—Justice Powell was appointed 
in 1972, retired in 1987, and Justice Marshall was appointed in 1967, retired in 
1991—their jurisprudential perspectives were much farther than their seats on the 
bench.  Their different lives placed them on two sides of the societal coin, Justice 
Powell on the “white privilege” side and Marshall on the “Negro inferiority” side.  
Their vastly unique perspectives and the Brown v. Board of Education2 decision 
made the 1970s and 1980s an exciting time for education reform. 
Part II will contrast the Justices’ views on mandated busing as a remedy for 
integration.  Justice Powell believed court mandated busing was unconstitutional, 
significantly disrupted education, and imposed on local officials’ responsibility to 
integrate.  Conversely, Justice Marshall felt that forced busing was a constitutional 
means to integrate a divided society maintained by local segregation.  Part III will 
contrast the Justices’ views on educational funding schemes.  Once again, the two 
Justices found themselves on different sides of the same coin and held opposing 
views on how the Equal Protection Clause should apply to Texas’s educational 
funding scheme.  Justice Powell trusted school boards to make reasonable and fair 
funding schemes without the imposition of the court.  Justice Marshall did not trust 
 
∗   B.S., College of William & Mary, 2011; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2014.  Thank you to the 
Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple for all of his guidance and expertise on this Note. 
1   See generally, Angela Nicole Johnson, Note, Intersectionality, Life Experience & Judicial 
Decisionmaking: A New View of Gender at the Supreme Court, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
353 (2014).  
2   37 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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local regimes because racism was still prevalent in American society. 
Part IV will focus on the transition from racial integration to rectification as the 
Court grappled with defining ‘equality’ and the constitutionality of implementing 
affirmative action programs.  Powell recognized the history of discrimination, 
however, the history could not justify racial preference programs in perpetuity, 
especially when it infringed on reasonable expectations of innocent individuals.  
Marshall believed integration should be accomplished by any means necessary 
because historical discrimination usurped many opportunities for blacks and 
integration would ameliorate America’s bleak history.  Part V will discuss Powell 
and Marshall’s differing viewpoints on affirmative action admissions programs best 
illustrated in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.  Taking a more textual 
approach, Powell believed race could be one consideration for admission, but racial 
preferential programs should be phased out in the near future to ensure equality for 
all.  Taking a more historical and legislative intent approach, Marshall believed 
preferential racial programs were a necessity to ameliorate past and present 
discrimination that remains prevalent in our society.  By applying the Justices’ 
arguments in Bakke and jurisprudential patterns to the affirmative action case 
currently under consideration by the Supreme Court, Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin, this Note will predict their decisions as if they were still on the bench. 
 
I. TWO ROADS DIVERGED IN A YELLOW WOOD:3 THE JUSTICES’ 
BACKGROUNDS 
 
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. was born in Suffolk, Virginia in 1907 and grew up 
in Richmond, Virginia.4  He received his bachelors and law degree from 
Washington and Lee University.  As a product of the Old South, Powell attended all 
white schools, lived in a household with all black servants, and harbored the 
mentality that blacks were inferior.  Like many Southern whites, he never 
questioned this way of life especially in Virginia where segregation was the status 
quo.5  In 1954, after Brown “condemned a way of life,”6 partners at Powell’s law 
firm, Hunton and Williams, represented Prince Edward County in Allen v. County 
School Board.7  Powell’s colleagues persuaded the district court to uphold “separate 
but equal” schools because it would not be practical to implement integration 
immediately.8  Interestingly, Justice Thurgood Marshall was opposing counsel in 
the case and persuaded the Fourth Circuit to reverse.  The Fourth Circuit’s opinion 
forced the county to integrate with “deliberate speed” as the Supreme Court set out 
in Brown. 
 
 3.  Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, POEMHUNTER, http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/the-road-not-
taken/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
 4.  JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 16, 139 (1994). 
 5.  Id. at 139. 
 6.  Id. at 131. 
 7.  249 F.2d 462, 463 (4th Cir. 1957). 
 8.  JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 139. 
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As a firm believer in precedent, Powell “thought the constitutionality of 
segregation was conclusively established by long acceptance.”9  He even stated in a 
letter that the segregation cases in regards to “the school decisions were wrongly 
decided.”10  As a man in his early fifties when Brown was decided, the mentality of 
black inferiority had permeated his psyche for a half-century.  According to Powell, 
he would “never favor compulsory integration” because desegregation cases were 
contrary to constitutional precedent and social policy.11  However, Powell’s 
discontent with the Brown decision reflected not only his segregated past but also 
his grassroots philosophy.  Powell’s bottom-up belief in change differed from the 
top-down approach used by the Court to implement integration.  Issuing such a 
pervasive precedent, that infiltrated school boards across the nation, from the aloof 
and disconnected Supreme Court, displeased Powell.  He disapproved the Court’s 
overreaching decision to change social policy. 
As a leader in his community, Powell spurred local education reform in 
Richmond, Virginia.  Powell was appointed to the Richmond school board in 1950 
and served as chairman for eight years beginning in 1952.12  After serving the local 
school board, he was appointed to the State Board of Education.  Education reform 
was important to Powell because his Uncle Ned, a teacher, nurtured Powell’s deep 
affection for learning and scholarship.  His father, Louis Sr., influenced Powell’s 
appreciation of education as the key to economic success.13  In Richmond, Powell 
reformed education by improving the sciences, mathematics, foreign languages, and 
international politics programs in response to the Space Race.  Moreover, he 
augmented teacher salaries and built new schools.14  Despite the positive reform, 
Powell’s service on the school board was not perfect. 
During Powell’s time on the board, the system of segregated schools was still 
intact.15  Throughout Powell’s tenure, dual attendance zones for “white” and 
“Negro” schools were maintained despite the school board’s authority to assign 
black and white pupils to the same schools and help facilitate integration.16  
Moreover, the obvious solution of rezoning children from overcrowded “Negro” 
schools to under-enrolled white schools was diverted and the school board opted to 
build additional black schools instead.  The Court in Bradley v. School Board17 held 
the school board responsible for preserving a discriminatory scheme because it had 
not changed the dual attendance system or the feeder school system.18  Powell’s 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 140. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 160. 
 14.  Id. at 163−67. 
 15.  Id. at 141. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  382 U.S. 103 (1965). 
 18.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 141.  Because of the dual attendance system, black children walked past 
white schools to attend designated “Negro Schools.”  In the feeder school system, after a child was assigned 
to a particular school, the child progressed through a pattern from white elementary to white junior high to 
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reaction to Brown’s mandate to integrate with “all deliberate speed” was the 
issuance of a press release stating the Richmond school board’s decision to wait for 
Virginian law to reflect on integration.19  The press release was not Powell’s only 
successful dodge of integration, but he also acted similarly during his service on the 
State School Board.  Within the first year of his appointment, the board issued 
regulations authorizing local school boards to resume control of pupil placement as 
directed by the General Assembly.20  The shift in responsibility allowed Powell to 
dodge the issue of segregation once again leaving the localities, counties, and city 
school boards with the issue of integration.21  From his silence, one would think 
Powell agreed with the status quo.  However, Powell was a man of many layers. 
Behind the muteness, Powell actually held a more positive view of integration.  
Despite the fact that Powell’s children attended all-white private schools and his 
firm fought to delay integration efforts, segregation was a point of contention for 
Powell.22  As an Officer of the Court who held the law at the utmost respect, he 
wanted Virginia to proceed in good faith to implement Brown, despite the lack of 
popularity.23  He disapproved—but hesitantly voted for—public tuition grants used 
to fund all white private education.24  The private school scheme sustained 
segregation since privately owned establishments were not required to integrate; 
therefore, public schools became designated “black schools” and private schools 
became designated “white schools.”  The private tuition grants maintained the 
unconstitutional dual system banned by the Supreme Court.  Even though Powell 
appeared to facilitate segregation while on the school board, he performed discrete 
acts that proved he was a proponent of integration. 
In 1956, Virginia considered applying the doctrine of interposition, which 
asserted the right of states to declare federal actions unconstitutional, to the Brown 
decision.25  Powell vehemently opposed the lawless notion of interposition because 
Virginia did not have a right to find the Supreme Court’s decision “null, void and of 
no effect.”26  His four arguments against interposition included: 1) interposition was 
the unconstitutional doctrine of nullification; 2) chaos would amount if the states 
could decide for itself the constitutionality of federal actions; 3) nullification 
essentially began the Civil War and due to its historical background is invalid; 4) 
the radical position disrespected law and order and should be disregarded instead of 
damage the Supreme Court’s authority.  Powell pronounced, “[i]t seems obvious 
that we cannot expect to preserve our cherished institutions and maintain their 
positions of public respect and confidence, if we praise them only when their 
 
white high school, or from black elementary to black junior high to black high school. 
 19.  Id. at 143. 
 20.  Id. at 169. 
 21.  Id. at 169−170. 
 22.  Id. at 160. 
 23.  Id. at 145. 
 24.  Id. at 174. 
 25.  Id. at 145. 
 26.  Id. at 147. 
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actions please us and defy and denounce them when their actions displease us.”27 
Despite Powell’s campaign against interposition and Richmond school board’s 
open opposition to massive resistance, Virginia launched an entire campaign 
against the Brown decision by closing schools to prevent desegregation.  However, 
Powell’s efforts were not futile because he continued to advocate against massive 
resistance in political spaces and eventually Virginians began to listen.  Powell 
helped prepare a presentation at the Rotunda Club for the governor, attorney 
general, lieutenant governor and reporters.  Through the presentation, Powell 
expressed the many cons of massive resistance and its effect on Virginia’s industry, 
reputation, and community.28  Powell emphasized the correlation between the 
school crisis, economic downfall, and lack of industrial development urging 
Virginia to integrate before it spurred into an economic depression.  He argued that 
United States citizens would not move to a state that closed schools and acted 
unlawfully against the highest court of the nation.29  Support of massive resistance 
quickly dwindled30 after the Rotunda presentation, marking a key event in 
Virginia’s history.31 
Powell was not considered a leader in integration, but he fostered a more 
accepting political environment for integration in Virginia.  His passion and 
dedication to public education in Richmond was insurmountable and every year 
after Brown, Powell began to accept, embrace, and advocate for integration.32  Who 
knew that the same Southern gentleman who grew up in an era of racial divide 
would one day swear in Douglas Wilder, the first black governor of Virginia and 
the United States?  With great effervescence Powell proclaimed, “It’s a great day 
for Virginia!”33 
Even though Justice Powell and Justice Thoroughgood34 “Thurgood” Marshall 
lived only one hundred and fifty miles from one another, they led very different 
lives.  Growing up in Baltimore, Maryland in the segregated South, Marshall only 
attended all black schools and constantly dealt with whites’ open hostility toward 
Negroes. Marshall attended Lincoln University, also known as the “Black 
Princeton,” for undergrad and Howard University, a historically black college, for 
law school.35  Thurgood Marshall was greatly influenced by the strength of his 
mother, Norma Marshall, and the bold inquisitiveness of his father, William 
Marshall.  Interestingly, William Marshall became the first black man to serve on a 
 
 27.  Id. at 148. 
 28.  Id. at 151−52; Interview with Virginius Dabney, Retired Editor, Richmond Times-Dispatch (July 31, 
1975) (transcript available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/A-0311-2/A-0311-2.html). 
 29.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 152. 
 30.  Interview with Virginius Dabney, supra note 28. 
 31.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 151−53. 
 32.  Id. at 176. 
 33.  Id. at 181−82. 
 34.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 176 (1994).  As a young child, Marshall’s first name, 
‘Thoroughgood’ was shortened to ‘Thurgood,’ making it easier for second grade Marshall to spell. 
 35.  Id. at 179 (explaining that Marshall attended Howard since the University of Maryland in Baltimore 
did not admit blacks). 
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grand jury in Baltimore and had the race question omitted from consideration by the 
grand jury.  This strong sense of black pride and respect for the courts encouraged 
Thurgood Marshall to pursue a career in law.  Through law, he could help bring 
blacks out of the somber predicament of racial inequality and inferiority.  One 
principle iterated by his father was: “Anyone calls you nigger, you not only got my 
permission to fight him—you got my orders to fight him.”36  Even though Marshall 
did not take his father’s principle to heart literally, he did figuratively by working 
hard in law school, engaging in tireless litigation, and continuing the fight against 
Negro inferiority. 
Post-law school and during the Great Depression, Thurgood Marshall opened a 
practice, which did not receive much business.  The dearth of black lawyers, 
approximately twelve in Baltimore, did not receive support from the black 
community because black attorneys lacked societal influence.37  Even when work 
did come, it was usually pro bono.  By representing poor clients, he eventually 
acquired a good reputation throughout the community.38  In 1934, Marshall became 
very involved with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) by providing legal counsel to the Baltimore branch and arguing 
cases that moved toward equality for blacks in America.39  From arguing against 
segregated universities to suing school boards to increase black teachers’ salaries, 
Marshall began making his mark on education through litigation.  Much of 
Marshall’s work in education involved chipping away at the “separate but equal” 
doctrine founded in Plessy v. Ferguson.40  Using constitutionally based arguments, 
Marshall constantly undermined the “equal” prong by exposing unequal differences 
between white and black institutions regarding curricula, faculty, equipment, and 
facilities.  Thurgood Marshall, Charles H. Houston,41 and William I. Gosnell42 
 
 36.  Id. at 177. 
 37.  Id. at 182 (Marshall would soon debunk the myth that black attorneys did not have societal 
influence). 
 38.  Id. at 182. 
 39.  Id. at 184. 
 40.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 41.  NAACP History: Charles Hamilton Houston, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-
charles-hamilton-houston (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  Charles Hamilton Houston was a black lawyer who 
trained Thurgood Marshall, argued many civil rights cases between 1930 and 1956, and served as special 
counsel to the NAACP.  He attended Harvard Law School and became the first African-American editor of 
the Harvard Law Review.  His main goal through litigation was to demonstrate how the states failed in 
maintaining “separate but equal” facilities in that officials only held true to the separate prong not the equal 
requirement. 
 42.  F. Michael Higginbotham & Jose F. Anderson, William I. Gosnell: Brown’s Unsung Hero, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (July 6, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2048657.  
Gosnell attended the University of Chicago law school and received scholarship under the same program as 
Pearson to attend an out of state school. He served as the legal director of the NAACP in Pearson v. Murray 
and encouraged Murray—the plaintiff—to challenge the segregation policy by writing a letter to the president 
of the university, Raymond Pearson, and suing if he was not accepted. Though Gosnell specialized in 
commercial litigation such as real-estate and probate, he continued to fight for civil rights by arguing Durkee 
v. Murphy, 29 A.2d 253 (1942), where the plaintiff sued Baltimore City for its limitations of black players on 
certain courses and inferior facilities of black golf courses as compared to white courses. This case spurred 
litigation about integrating golf courses throughout the country. See also MARVIN P. DAWKINS & GRAHAM C. 
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argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the state to provide equal treatment 
in public funded facilities and refrain from denying one race a right possessed by 
another race.43 
In the beginning, Marshall used the cost analysis to advocate for desegregation 
emphasizing that, “the best overall strategy seemed to be an attack against the 
segregation system by law suits . . . on the theory that the extreme cost of 
maintaining two ‘equal’ school systems would eventually destroy segregation.”44  
Even under the “separate but equal” principle, providing separate medical schools, 
law schools, and graduate school programs for blacks that offered the same benefits 
as state schools for whites placed exorbitant costs on state governments.  Moreover, 
creating separate entities for the small number of Negro citizens in the country was 
a waste of resources.  Marshall successfully used the economic theory in Pearson v. 
Murray, where a highly qualified black man was denied admission to the University 
of Maryland’s law school solely because of his race.  Since there was not an 
alternative law school in Maryland for blacks, the state gave blacks a $200 
scholarship to attend an out-of-state black law school.  This case in particular was 
dear to Marshall because he had considered attending the University of Maryland’s 
law school in Baltimore.  He decided not to apply because of Maryland’s Jim Crow 
laws, took the scholarship given by the state, and commuted an hour to Howard 
University, which proved very expensive.45  In Pearson, the court held that equal 
treatment could only be furnished in the one Maryland law school provided by the 
state and granted the black petitioner admission.46  The opinion discussed the cost 
of attending Howard compared to the University of Maryland even though 
Howard’s tuition was sixty-eight dollars cheaper than the University of Maryland.  
Commuting costs, the cost of living in Washington D.C., and moving expenses 
augmented the cost associated with out-of-state attendance at a black private 
school; the exorbitant costs were evidence of unequal treatment.47  It was 
unconstitutional for Maryland to essentially use other states’ schools to educate its 
citizens.  Other states were expending their financial resources building Negro 
schools while the state of Maryland relinquished its responsibility to furnish a 
“separate but equal” law school for black citizens. 
Though the economic argument was successful in Pearson, it did not prove 
very successful in litigating segregation cases generally.  In response to the 
NAACP’s cases against University of Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, and 
Kentucky, states continued to create Jim Crow law schools and graduate programs 
 
KINLOCH, AFRICAN AMERICAN GOLFERS DURING THE JIM CROW ERA 138 (2000). 
 43.  Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 593 (Md. 1936). 
 44.  Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in Education 
Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO. EDUC. 318 (1952). 
 45.  KLUGER, supra note 34, at 179 (commuting was so expensive that Marshall worked numerous jobs 
to pay for school expenses and his mother even sold her engagement ring and wedding band to help with 
costs). 
 46.  Pearson, 182 A. at 593. 
 47.  Id. 
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with the promise of striving for equality.48  After bleak success in invalidating 
discriminatory graduate programs, Marshall’s strategy began to transform as he 
moved from the graduate school arena to the elementary school arena to attack 
segregation.  Using an amalgamation of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and 
constitutional law, he persuaded the Court that separate could never be equal. 
The transformation from the economic argument to the social science argument 
is best viewed in Sweatt v. Painter.49  Marshall mentioned that the facts in Sweatt v. 
Painter, would have supported the economic argument because the University of 
Texas assumed the plaintiff would challenge the equality of the Jim Crow law 
school compared to the white law school.  Therefore, Texas appropriated 
$2,600,000 to build a new Negro university and allotted $500,000 per year for the 
new school’s upkeep.  Even though the reaction of the Texas legislature supported 
the theory that segregation was more expensive than integration, Marshall did not 
use the economic argument to win the case. Instead, he tackled desegregation head 
on.50  Marshall convinced the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the 
Equal Protection Clause required the petitioner’s admission into the white 
university.  Marshall used anthropology and legal experts, who testified that race 
did not impact a child’s ability to learn and that equal facilities did not presume 
equal educational opportunities.  Here, in Painter, his use of social science that 
would ultimately win Brown began to surface.  Marshall argued that the University 
of Texas Law School had certain subjective qualities, such as faculty reputation, 
administrative experience, alumni position and influence, community, and prestige 
that made it a better institution than the Jim Crow school.  In addition to subjective 
qualities, the Court noted that law is a profession that requires interactive learning.  
“[T]he interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is 
concerned”51 was nonexistent in the Jim Crow law school since the petitioner 
would not have the opportunity to engage with Texan lawyers—most of which 
attend the University of Texas.  Without intellectual stimulation and discussion 
with students of varying backgrounds, the petitioner would not receive an equal 
education.52  Though the Court did not overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, this case was 
another step toward its inevitable overturn by Brown. 
Justice Marshall’s reaction to Brown was very different from Justice Powell’s.  
As a target of racial discrimination and a passionate advocate for black people, 
Marshall saw how the adversarial system improved college and graduate program 
acceptance rates of black students.  Marshall “demanded that the Court fix a date 
 
 48.  Marshall, supra note 44, at 318−19 (referencing the Gaines and Bluford case where two African 
Americans were not admitted to the University of Missouri). 
 49.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 50.  Marshall, supra note 44, at 319. 
 51.  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
 52.  Essentially, the Court argued that diversity is a compelling interest for exposing the black petitioner 
to the diverse thought found in the all-white law school. Ironically, this argument would be used seventy-three 
years later, at the same university to argue that exposing white students to the diverse thought of minority 
students is a compelling interest in having affirmative action admissions programs. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at 
Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 227 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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for the end of segregation in the schools” after the Brown decision.53  Though 
impractical since segregation plagued the American lifestyle for over three hundred 
years, a fixed date would quickly initiate desegregation efforts and incentivize state 
governments to enforce the Supreme Court’s mandate.  The Court’s decision was a 
hard pill to swallow, but Marshall believed the top-down approach was the best way 
to spur integration.  Conversely, Powell waited for the Virginia legislature to 
address the issue even though his influence on the school board could have quickly 
facilitated change.  As a grassroots proponent, Powell advocated for a more gradual 
change where local governments developed innovative integration plans without 
creating massive upheaval.  According to Powell, the decision applied pressure to 
integrate and the depth of its mandate would automatically spur education reform.  
Fixing a date would be difficult and quite unnecessary. 
Even though both men viewed Brown differently, the combination of their 
ideals propelled integration efforts.  Years after the Brown decision, both Justices’ 
perspectives seemed to evolve.  In 1960, Marshall had a staggering confession, 
which juxtaposed his militant idea to fix a date for desegregation.  He began to 
favor a more practical approach realizing that “old habits die hard.”  Integration did 
not move as swiftly as Marshall hoped, but the courtroom served as a venue to 
place racial issues on the forefront of America’s political agenda.  Marshall 
believed that Brown and other desegregation cases would not ultimately integrate 
school systems, but they acted as a “holding action,” opening the door to address 
the disconnect between education reform and race relations.54  The ultimate 
solution to integration “w[ould] only [happen] when the Negro t[ook] his part in the 
community, voting and otherwise.”55  Here, during Marshall’s epiphany, Powell’s 
school of thought and Marshall’s practical sensibilities met at a crossroad.  Powell 
and Marshall agreed that efforts within the local communities were essential to 
implementing desegregation.  Marshall realized that the final solution did not solely 
lie within the black community, but in blacks’ participation in the greater 
community on a grassroots level. 
As a proponent for changing social policy through litigation, Justice Marshall 
recognized that Brown’s urgency initiated education reform around the nation.  
Though a grassroots man at heart, Justice Powell realized that the judiciary’s power 
was focused in its ability to flag important issues in the community, place them on 
the public agenda, and spur robust conversation and debate in the media, 
classrooms, workplaces, and social settings.56  Here Marshall’s school of thought 
and Powell’s realizations about Brown met at another crossroad.  The ritualistic 
confines of litigation initiated change and increased awareness.  The less formal 
interactions in the community mobilized individuals, forced action, and 
 
 53.  JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS 
TROUBLED LEGACY 83 (Oxford University Press 2001). 
 54.  Id. at 118. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  TIMOTHY J. O’NEILL, BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN THE CLASSROOM 
OF LITIGATION 256 (Wesleyan University Press 1985). 
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implemented change as well.  Powell was correct in that community leaders were 
not reading the Supreme Court’s one hundred and fifty page opinions, but they 
discussed the topics considered by the Court and helped create solutions that 
progressed towards greater equality for all. 
Even though their thoughts met at a crossroad throughout their time on the 
bench, the nuances that made their jurisprudences different often placed them on 
opposite sides of an opinion.  Powell trusted community efforts more than Marshall 
and their opposing views on education reform were evident from many opinions. 
 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BUSING 
 
“[T]his Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary 
transportation away from their neighborhoods . . . It is at [the elementary] age level 
that neighborhood education performs its most vital role.” 
Justice Lewis Powell, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 251 
(1973). 
 
“To suggest, as does the majority, that a Detroit-only [busing] plan somehow 
remedies the effects of de jure segregation of the races is, in my view, to make a 
solemn mockery of Brown I’s holding that separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal . . . .” 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 809 (1974). 
 
Eight months before Powell was sworn in on January 7, 1972, the Supreme 
Court of the United States unanimously held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education57 that district courts have the authority to override school board 
integration plans and create remedies to insure racially mixed schools.  Based on 
the school board’s statutory history of upholding a dual enrollment system and 
Brown’s demand to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” grouping non-
contiguous school zones and busing students to different parts of the city were 
appropriate tools for integrating public schools.  As long as the time or distance of 
travel was not so great as to cause a health risk or impinge on the educational 
process, the remedial measures were deemed constitutional.58 
Powell was not pleased with the Swann holding.59  He abhorred busing and his 
qualms with Swann were revealed in his part concurring and part dissenting opinion 
in Keyes v. School District No. 1.60  In Keyes, the plaintiffs claimed the school 
board engaged in racial segregation by manipulating school zoning and school site 
selection while enforcing neighborhood policies that kept schools racially 
separated.  Since Denver’s school board did not have a statutory dual system, like 
 
 57.  402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 58.  Id. at 30. 
 59.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 282−83. 
 60.  413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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many Southern states post-Brown, the petitioners had to prove that Denver engaged 
in systematic segregation creating a dual system or that Denver engaged in de jure 
segregation by proving 1) the existence of segregated schools, and 2) the state’s 
intention to maintain segregation.61  Much of the majority’s argument was 
formulated around Swann’s premise: the difference between de jure segregation—
the unconstitutional separation by law—and de facto segregation—the 
constitutional separation without government responsibility—was intent.  Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a school board could rebut the prima facie case of de jure 
segregation with clear and convincing evidence that justified its actions.62 
The majority in Keyes, which Marshall joined, remanded the case to the district 
court for several reasons.  The Court believed evidence of “feeder” schools, 
segregated school zones, and student transfers of black children to black schools 
and white children to white schools could prove the existence of a dual system.63  It 
held that discovering intentionally segregative actions by the school board created a 
presumption that “other segregated schooling within the system [was] not 
adventitious.”64  Since the Court found intentional segregation in some of the 
schools at issue, segregative intent was proved and on remand, the school board had 
to rebut the prima facie case and show that the racially motivated policies were not 
created to preserve segregation.  Though this case is not a busing case, Powell was 
very strategic in expressing his constitutional arguments about desegregation and 
voicing his opinions on busing. 
In his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Powell addressed the 
necessity of abandoning the de jure and de facto distinction emphasized in Swann 
and the majority in Keyes.  The distinction only created different standards for 
Southern and Northern states.  Swann found that a state with “a long history” of 
statutorily imposed apartheid automatically engaged in de jure segregation.  
Therefore, intent was not a requirement in the prima facie case against a Southern 
state.  In essence, racial separation without a history of statutory segregation did not 
violate constitutional rights.65  Under this regime, Northern cities escaped 
chastisement by hiding in the shadows of de facto segregation and public resistance 
of the segregated South.66  Powell found it unfair that Northern cities with heavy 
concentrations of minorities and segregated schools had to prove intent since they 
did not have a “history” of statutorily imposed segregation.  In fact, many Northern 
states discarded their statutes before Brown67 was decided but continued to practice 
segregation.  Therefore, Northern states did have a history of statutorily imposed 
 
 61.  Id. at 192 n.4, 198 (listing the core city schools). 
 62.  Id. at 208−10. 
 63.  Id. at 201−02. 
 64.  Id. at 208. 
 65.  Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 66.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 291. 
 67.  Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), held that state compelled or authorized segregation of public schools 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) held that the state must take 
affirmative action to desegregate public schools. 
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segregation. 
Powell asserted that segregated schools in biracial metropolitan areas, whether 
Northern or Southern, “did not result from historic, state-imposed de jure 
segregation . . . [but from] segregated residential and migratory patterns . . . of 
which [were] . . . perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public school 
authorities.”68  However, Powell’s statement is untrue.  The generally accepted 
notion in many metropolitan areas during the 1970’s was that “school officials’ 
practices may have [had] a substantial impact upon housing patterns . . . .”69  The 
dictionary defines ‘perpetuate’ as “continuing without intermission or 
interruption.”70  Powell’s statement portrayed school officials as passive bystanders 
rather than active participants in school segregation.  School segregation in 
metropolitan areas was a product of segregated housing while complacent school 
boards lurked in the shadows of racism.  This cannot be true when school boards 
were key players in deterring black students from attending white schools in 
metropolitan areas even after Brown I.  School boards could no longer rely on Jim 
Crow laws and racist state Constitutions because it was their duty to eliminate 
segregation “root and branch.”71  Many metropolitan school boards decided to act 
contradictory to the mandate and implemented covert segregation tactics instead of 
integration solutions. 
For instance, in Kansas City (“KC”), a hyper-segregated metropolitan area, the 
school board shifted attendance zones to bus white students past black schools to 
white schools on the west side of the city.72  Through segregative practices, the 
school board flagged racially identifiable schools for whites which contributed to 
the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods.”73  School board officials in KC did 
not merely perpetuate segregation, but actively refused to implement busing, 
equalize funding across districts, and change school boundaries to facilitate 
integration.  In the 1960s, KC rejected a plan to build a series of integrated middle 
schools and implemented an “intact busing” program where black students were 
bused to white schools, but were segregated within the program.  Therefore, black 
students learned in separate classrooms, had recess at a different time, and ate lunch 
on a different schedule from the white students.74  West side busing system, lack of 
corrective remedies, and “intact busing” arrangements were ways KC hid under the 
umbrella of de facto segregation.  Metropolitan segregation methods “belie[d] any 
notion that the historical development of racial segregation in schools and housing 
was ‘natural,’ accidental, immutable, or caused by remote and uncontrollable 
 
 68.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222−23 (emphasis added). 
 69.  Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 470 (D. Mass. 1974). 
 70.  Perpetuate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perpetual?s=t (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013). 
 71.  Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437−38 (1968). 
 72.  Kevin Fox Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and 
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 43 AMER. STUDIES 5, 6, 18 (2002). 
 73.  Id. at 5, 18, 20, 22. 
 74.  Intact busing is basically the unconstitutional idea of “separate but equal.” 
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demographic forces or migration processes.”75  Local school board officials not 
only perpetuated but also explicitly created racially segregated school systems 
regardless of housing structure.76 
Similarly in Boston, Massachusetts, the figures showed starkly segregated 
schools due to the board’s implementation of feeder patterns and segregated 
enrollment programs.77  Boston’s use of open enrollment programs—where parents 
could opt out of their neighborhood school to choose a different—racially 
homogeneous—school, exacerbated racial segregation by contributing to the dual 
school system.78  In 1971, Boston adopted the controlled transfer policy to replace 
open enrollment.  The controlled transfer policy allowed students to transfer to a 
school outside their neighborhood or zoning district only when there were open 
seats available.79  However, the controlled transfer policy had many exceptions, 
which essentially swallowed the rule.  First, the grandfather clause allowed students 
who attended out of district schools to continue attending if a seat remained open.  
Second, it allowed those students, who applied the previous year but were not 
accepted to an out of district school, to transfer to an out of district school of their 
choice the next year.  The third exception allowed brothers and sisters of transfer 
students to gain access to out of district schools.  Fourth, transfers were granted 
within a multi-school district.  Lastly, the catchall exception, or the hardship clause, 
ironically allowed transfers on the basis of racial grounds and without showing 
parental hardship.80  Boston’s school board even built small schools to serve 
classified racial groups and the neighborhood concept was only used in 
overwhelmingly segregated residential areas.81  In Morgan v. Hennigan, Boston’s 
schools argued that segregated housing and migration of the black population to the 
city was responsible for segregation.  Similar to Powell’s support of the 
neighborhood system in Keyes, Boston argued that the neighborhood policy was 
constitutional despite segregative effects.  However, Boston’s implementation of 
the controlled transfer system, extensive busing to racially segregated schools, and 
feeder patterns were anti-neighborhood policies since they intentionally placed 
students in schools outside their neighborhoods.  Boston could not use the 
neighborhood concept to mask its segregative acts, especially since they were 
removing white children from their neighborhood schools and busing them across 
the city to white schools.  In this instance, housing patterns did not cause school 
segregation; the school board’s active role in keeping schools segregated was the 
essential link. 
 
 75.  Gotham, supra note 72, at 5, 29−30. 
 76.  See also GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD TO AN 
EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST. LOUIS 71−82 (2004) (explaining the continued segregation of education after 
Brown in the metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri). 
 77.  Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974). 
 78.  Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 590 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 79.  Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 449 (emphasis added). 
 80.  Id. at 454−55 (explaining all the exceptions of the controlled transfer policy). 
 81.  Id. at 479. 
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Nashville, Tennessee, and Chicago, Illinois, were two other metropolitan areas 
with boards that actively segregated schools.  In the late 1950s, Nashville contained 
overlapping districts of white and black schools in the city proper, but there 
remained segregated schools even though white and black families lived in close 
proximity.82  Since one third of the counties in Nashville did not offer public high 
schools for blacks, some black students had to pay tuition and commute to all-black 
facilities in another county.83  The Nashville school board was not eliminating 
segregation “root and branch” but rather opposed integration vehemently.  The 
school board even denied a request of two white professors at Fisk University—the 
only unsegregated college in Nashville—who asked permission to enroll their 
children in black schools near the university.84  Even though community members 
tried to progress toward integration, Nashville’s board stood firm in hindering 
advancement.  Chicago’s school board did more than just “perpetuate” school 
segregation by setting up mobile classrooms—called ‘Willis Wagons’—as a 
solution to overcrowded black schools.  The school board could have facilitated 
integration by sending black students to nearby under-enrolled white schools, but 
they did not.  Coined after Chicago’s school superintendent who served from 1953 
to 1966, Willis Wagons hindered black children’s access to “good” schools and 
facilitated segregation via school board action.85 
Intentionally circumventing the holdings of Brown, metropolitan school boards 
played an active role in causing segregated schools and implementing segregative 
policies.  Despite evidence on the contrary, Powell claimed school officials were 
mere bystanders, only perpetuating the difficult situation of segregated housing.  
Due to Powell’s past service on the school board, he was sympathetic to school 
officials, who were in the midst of racial unrest and school integration.  While the 
Court gave orders from above, the infantry on the ground—school officials, 
legislators, and the American people—were engaged in a racial conundrum, trying 
to find the best way to desegregate the nation.  Powell’s theory and evidence on the 
contrary raised the classic question: what came first, the racist school board or the 
segregated neighborhood?  Segregated neighborhoods most likely affected 
segregated schooling, but Powell downplayed school boards’ roles in actively 
facilitating school segregation. 
Despite Powell’s incorrect characterization of school board officials, his 
assertion that there should be one uniform standard of detecting segregation for all 
schools was correct.86  “[P]ublic school segregation exists to a substantial degree 
 
 82.  John Egerton, Walking into History: The Beginning of School Desegregation in Nashville, 
SOUTHERN SPACES (May 4, 2009), http://www.southernspaces.org/2009/walking-history-beginning-school-
desegregation-nashville. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  New Schools and Willis Wagons: Fight School Segregation!, UNIV. OF ILL. 
http://www.uic.edu/depts/lib/specialcoll/services/rjd/CULExhibit/Urban%20League%20Exhibit/main.htm 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2014). 
 86.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 232. 
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[when] there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible 
school board.”87  Figures were enough to show prima facie evidence, and the school 
board must prove it operated under an integrated system.88  Segregative intent 
should have been abandoned because it is impossible to discern, leads to 
unpredictable outcomes, and provides little relevance to the existence of a 
segregated school system.89  The effect of a system is significant; intent is 
irrelevant.  Powell’s argument for standard equality between the North and the 
South revealed his pride in and loyalty to the South.  Even though the South 
egregiously resisted integration and the North secretly upheld segregation, it was 
important for the Court to use equal standards and strike a balanced approach in 
determining whether a school board engaged in segregation. 
Next, Powell addressed the majority’s criticism that the ‘neighborhood school’ 
concept adopted in Keyes was maintained to facilitate segregation.90  Powell 
believed the neighborhood school system offered many positive aspects to the 
community: it strengthened the neighborhood, provided easy access to public 
education, facilitated extracurricular activities, and fostered political support for 
community issues.91  Moreover, the neighborhood concept’s national use validated 
its constitutionality.92  After advocating the neighborhood concept, Powell 
addressed his qualms with extensive busing regimes validated by Swann.93  
According to Powell, busing destroyed the traditional connectedness of the home, 
church and school life of children.94  He was not an advocate of busing, calling it 
“[t]he single most disruptive element in education . . . .”95  He feared the anonymity 
and rootlessness of city busing would destroy the sense of belonging found in the 
community.  With meticulous care, Powell argued that busing interfered with a 
school board’s ultimate goal of producing quality education.96  Busing undermined 
the validity of the neighborhood by placing economic burdens on the community’s 
tax dollars and removing children from a familiar environment.97  Ordering a 
school board to discontinue segregative acts correctly punished the school board, 
but requiring the implementation of busing measures punished the students and 
parents.98  Though busing purported to aid integration efforts, it frustrated the 
purpose of Brown by augmenting the likelihood of segregation and exacerbating 
white flight.99  Whites would leave the public school system and flee to the suburbs, 
 
 87.  Id. at 235. 
 88.  Id. at 228, 236 
 89.  Id. at 233–34. 
 90.  Id. at 214. 
 91.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 248. 
 94.  Id. at 246; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285. 
 95.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253. 
 96.  Id.  See also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285. 
 97.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285. 
 98.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 249–50. 
 99.  Id. at 256–58; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285–86. 
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leaving poor whites and blacks to attend rotting city schools.100  Underlying his 
opinion, Powell feared that busing would hurt the education system found in white 
middle-class neighborhoods, similar to the ones he preserved while on the school 
board.  He was less concerned about the beneficial opportunities busing could 
provide for inner city black students.101  According to Powell, the mixing of 
deprived and poor black children with middle-class whites would taint the integrity 
and compromise the educational environment of white schools.102  Aligning with 
Powell’s grassroots theory and respect for states’ rights, he believed that school 
officials should bear the responsibility for instituting corrective measures of 
integration.  The state legislatures should facilitate education reform and 
“communities deserve the freedom and the incentive to turn their attention and 
energies to [the] goal of quality education, free from protracted and debilitating 
battles over court-ordered student transportation.”103 
Powell was very careful in framing his argument against busing because he 
took a hands-off approach when faced with the dilemma of integrating Richmond 
schools and was the sole white southerner on the Supreme Court.104  However, his 
careful framing did not hide the holes in his argument.  Divided communities could 
not progress toward quality education in a time of racial turmoil and unrest, until 
school boards began to seriously consider desegregation.  Placing integration back 
into the hands of a racially prejudiced school board that previously failed to 
implement corrective measures was not a practical remedy.  Where communities 
have failed to take valid steps toward integration, the court provided solutions, such 
as busing, to encourage lackadaisical school boards to move with expediency.  
Moreover, Powell’s blind advocacy for the neighborhood system did not take into 
account the practical realities and the context of American schools.  “Just as a good 
neighborhood tends to create and sustain a good school, a good school tends to 
create and sustain a good neighborhood.”105  Therefore, a bad neighborhood tends 
to create and sustain a bad school, and a bad school tends to create and sustain a bad 
neighborhood.  Neighborhood systems only positively affected good school 
communities, and they negatively affected bad school communities.106  Many 
school boards, including Boston’s, used the neighborhood concept to mask 
segregative policies.  In essence, the neighborhood system was de facto segregation 
by another name and created another way for metropolitan areas to hide behind the 
security of segregation. 
In contrast with Justice Powell, Justice Marshall was a busing advocate, which 
 
 100.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 286. 
 101.  Id. at 285. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253. 
 104.  Id. at 253. 
 105.  Kevin Fox Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and 
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 43 AMER. STUDIES 5, 30 (2002). 
 106.  Id. 
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was made clear in his dissent in Milliken v. Bradley.107  In Milliken, a federal 
district court required Detroit, Michigan to implement a multidistrict busing remedy 
after finding de jure segregation in the Detroit city schools.  The busing remedy 
would include fifty-three outlying districts that were not joined to the case.  The 
plaintiffs had not proven a constitutional violation in one district produced a 
significant segregative effect in another, specifically the outlying districts.108  Due 
to the influx of blacks in the inner city and the influx of whites in the Detroit 
suburbs, enforcing a comprehensive desegregation plan solely for the city would 
not integrate the public schools.  In a five to four decision, the Court decided to 
reverse the district court’s decision to enforce the multidistrict plan and remanded 
the case to discuss a remedy for only integrating Detroit city schools—not suburban 
schools.109 
Using the precedent set forth in Swann, Marshall believed the district court 
correctly required the State to implement the multi-district busing plan.  It was 
significant to include outlying suburban school districts because the State had a 
duty to remedy the constitutional violation of segregated schools in any meaningful 
fashion.110  The only available means to a constitutional end was the busing of 
children in predominantly white suburbs to predominately black city schools and 
vice versa.  Marshall reiterated the State’s duty to “eliminate root and branch” racial 
discrimination in public schools.  Michigan could only accomplish integration of 
Detroit by involving suburban school districts, and the majority’s limitation on the 
remedy to city schools only would maintain a segregated system.111 
Marshall’s second argument was two pronged: 1) the state of Michigan was 
ultimately responsible for segregating public schools in Detroit; and 2) an intra-
district busing plan was not sufficient to carry out the State’s constitutional duty.112  
Marshall criticized the majority’s emphasis on the local school boards’ 
independence and its requirement to prove the domino effect of unconstitutionality 
from one district to another.  According to Marshall, it was sufficient to implement 
a remedial plan since the State engaged in de jure segregation by passing laws 
prohibiting desegregation plans in 1970 and only disseminating transportation state 
funds to suburban schools, not city schools.  Though the State claimed the lack of 
transportation funds for the city fostered the neighborhood concept, the State 
conveniently implemented the neighborhood concept in segregated neighborhood 
schools.113  These statewide actions were enough to show that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated in city schools and suburban schools in Detroit.  
Moreover, as agents of the State, local school boards were subject to State control, 
 
 107.  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 108.  Id. at 745. 
 109.  Id. at 753. 
 110.  Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 111.  Id. at 787 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that all the Detroit inner city schools contained 
approximately seventy-five to ninety percent African American). 
 112.  Id. at 791–92, 798–99. 
 113.  Id. at 791–92. 
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and Michigan could have consolidated the school districts to implement the plan.114 
In regards to the second prong, the inclusion of outlying districts was not a ploy 
to impose racial balancing but a necessary means to achieve desegregation.115  
Moreover, the suburbs were very connected to the city proper.  Therefore, it would 
not be overwhelmingly burdensome to transport children from the city to the 
suburbs, or vice versa.116  Providing equitable relief via busing was within the 
court’s authority, since distance and time did not risk safety and health.117  Marshall 
also addressed the economic issues Powell raised about busing in Keyes.  Based on 
the facts of Milliken, 1,800 buses were underutilized and could subsidize the nine 
hundred buses needed to implement the multidistrict plan.  In Marshall’s opinions, 
he usually emphasized the significance of the facts of a particular case.  Similarly, 
Marshall stressed that the economic costs would be ameliorated since Michigan 
owned unused buses. 
Additionally, the majority misconstrued the principle that “the nature of the 
violation determine[d] the scope of the remedy” too narrowly when it held that 
including outlying districts exceeded the scope.  Using his practical jurisprudence, 
Marshall concluded that the “nature of a violation determined the scope of the 
remedy simply because the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to which 
it is addressed.”118  The remedy could not be narrowly construed at the risk of 
effectiveness, and the majority transformed “a simple commonsense rule into a 
cruel and meaningless paradox.”119  One statement in Marshall’s dissent 
highlighted his deep veneration for litigation and how it could be used to improve 
the racial divide:  
 
The Court, in my view, does a great disservice to the District Judge 
who labored long and hard with this complex litigation by accusing 
him of changing horses in midstream and shifting the focus of this 
case from the pursuit of a remedy for the condition of segregation 
within the Detroit school system to some unprincipled attempt to 
impose his own philosophy of racial balance on the entire Detroit 
metropolitan area.120   
 
The plan proposed by the District Court in Milliken would “help those children in 
the city of Detroit whose educations and very futures have been crippled by 
purposeful state segregation.”121  There was no reason to forfeit black students’ 
right to Equal Protection for integrated education due to malleable State procedures 
 
 114.  Id. at 796. 
 115.  Id. at 788. 
 116.  Id. at 804. 
 117.  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971). 
 118.  Milliken, 418 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 119.  Id. at 807 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 120.  Id. at 789–90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 812 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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and the nonexistent issue of school board independence.  Desegregation was a 
difficult task, but the Court’s support of suburban white flight in Milliken was a step 
backwards in the race to integration.  The majority decision encouraged complacent 
structuring of public schools in metropolitan areas and led to less aggressive means 
of integrating public schools.  It is not surprising that Powell joined the majority in 
Milliken because he deferred to the actions of the school board.122  Powell would 
say that the creation of neighborhood schools is a positive aspect to foster 
community and belongingness, but Marshall would agree with Powell’s law clerk, 
Jay Harvie Wilkinson III, who wrote that for too many blacks, their neighborhood 
schools “‘meant confinement, a slow suffocation in the dankness of the ghetto.  The 
school bus might mean hope, escape, the door to a new life of challenge and 
opportunity.’”123 
 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDUCATIONAL FUNDING PLANS 
 
“It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to 
nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens 
or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political 
subdivisions in which citizens live.” 
 Justice Lewis Powell, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
411 U.S. 1, 54 (1973). 
 
“For on this record, it is apparent that the State’s purported concern with local 
control is offered primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for 
interdistrict inequality.” 
 Justice Thurgood Marshall, San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973). 
 
Justice Powell’s sympathy for school board officials and his deference to their 
actions was noticeable in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.124  
In Rodriguez, Texas adopted a dual system for financing public education by 
extracting funds from local property taxes, State funds, and federal allotments.125  
Plaintiffs argued that disparities in funding between affluent school districts and 
poor districts were caused by stark differences in property taxes.  For example, in 
Edgewood Independent School District, the poor district where the plaintiffs 
resided, there were 22,000 students, ninety percent who were of Mexican descent.  
Edgewood’s property taxes contributed $26 per pupil in 1967; once the state and 
federal funds were added, the district spent $356 per pupil. 126  In Alamo Heights 
 
 122.  Id. at 791 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 123.  JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 297. 
 124.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 125.  Id. at 6. 
 126.  Id. at 12. 
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School District, the most affluent district in the city, there were 5,000 students, 
most of which were Anglo-Saxon, with only eighteen percent Mexican residents.  
Alamo Heights’ property taxes contributed $333 per pupil in 1967; once the state 
and federal funds were added, the district spent $594 per pupil.127  The District 
Court held that the financial scheme was unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but the Supreme Court reversed.128 
According to the appellants, the financing system was unequal—the poor 
districts did not contain the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility as 
wealthy districts.129  Writing for the majority, Powell set up a two-part analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause to determine the plan’s constitutionality: 1) 
whether the Texas financial system disadvantaged a suspect class or infringed upon 
a fundamental implicit or explicit constitutional right requiring judicial scrutiny or 
2) whether the plan rationally furthered some legitimate, articulated state purpose 
and did not constitute invidious discrimination under the rationality standard of 
review.130  In regards to the first prong, Powell ultimately concluded that the 
system, based on relative wealth, was not enough to create a suspect class.131  
Powell defined the “poor” as completely unable to pay for some desired benefit and 
unable to sustain absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that 
benefit.132  In Griffin v. Illinois,133 the Court held that a state law prohibiting 
indigent criminal defendants from obtaining an appeal transcript was 
unconstitutional because indigence revoked a fair opportunity to appeal.134  In 
Douglas v. California,135 the right to appointed counsel on direct appeal was 
granted to indigent defendants, who did not have resources to retrieve 
representation.136  Those burdened by attorney payments or relatively less-wealthy 
defendants were not classified as “poor” in Douglas.137  The plaintiffs in Rodriguez 
were not considered “poor” because not receiving public education was different 
from receiving a lower quality education, therefore absolute deprivation did not 
exist.138  “[T]he Equal Protection Clause [did] not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages,” and the mere presence of inequality did not violate the 
 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 6. 
 129.  Id. at 50. 
 130.  Id. at 17. 
 131.  Id. at 19. 
 132.  Id. at 20. 
 133.  351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 134.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 21. 
 135.  372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 136.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22. 
 137.  Id. at 21–22.  Powell also used Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that criminal 
penalties cannot be given to indigents simply because they were totally unable to pay incarceration fines; 
indigents did not include those who make relatively less money or those in which the fines are a heavy 
burden) and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating Texas’ expensive filing fee for primary 
elections, which barred potential candidates unable to pay access to the ballot). 
 138.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23. 
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Constitution.139  Moreover, the Court could not assume that poor people lived in 
poor districts, and Powell was unwilling to discuss the plaintiffs’ amorphous classes 
based on family income or district wealth discrimination.140  Since a suspect class 
did not exist and equal education based on relative wealth was not a guaranteed 
right under the Constitution, strict scrutiny did not apply. 
Under the second prong, Powell found the Texas plan rationally furthered a 
legitimate, articulated state purpose and did not constitute invidious discrimination.  
As a past school board official, Powell was familiar with the technicalities and 
complex details that comprised funding schemes for school districts.  The financial 
plan in Rodriguez, like the neighborhood concept in Keyes, was widely used across 
the country with “the Texas system [being] comparable to the systems employed in 
virtually every other State.”141  Powell’s hands-off approach was also prevalent in 
his discussion of the second prong, and he was vehemently against court imposition 
on states’ rights.  Justice Powell proclaimed that “the ultimate solutions [concerning 
tax reform in school education] must come from the lawmakers and from the 
democratic pressures of those who elect them.”142  The Court’s limited function 
prohibited it from imposing “its judicial imprimatur on the status quo.”143  Through 
the lens of a grassroots advocate, the Court would exceed the scope of the 
Constitution if it struck down the financial plan.  Supreme Court justices were not 
experts in school funding systems and did not have superior wisdom of legislators, 
scholars, and educational officials working diligently to better their communities.144 
Marshall had a different view of Rodriguez than his southern colleague; he 
found it unacceptable to submit the appellants to the “vagaries of the political 
process,” which was unfit to provide a non-discriminatory remedy.145  In his 
dissent, Marshall used the practical implications and historical context of the plan to 
prove Texas violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  The mission of the Minimum 
Foundation School Program was to improve the finances of property poor districts 
in relation to affluent districts.  However, the state program failed to subsidize 
despite the huge disparities in property taxes.146  Contrary to its mission, the 
program gave the most affluent district, Alamo Heights, more money per pupil than 
the poorer district, Edgewood.  Alamo received three dollars more than Edgewood 
in 1967, and by 1970 it received one hundred and thirty-five dollars more than 
Edgewood.  If variability in financing schemes were so significant as to affect 
educational opportunity and inequality between races, then the financing system 
reflected an intent to discriminate.  Marshall defined the suspect class as 
disadvantaged school children in Texas’ poor districts that received unequal 
 
 139.  Id. at 24. 
 140.  Id. at 28. 
 141.  Id. at 47–48. 
 142.  Id. at 59. 
 143.  Id. at 58. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 146.  Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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educational opportunities based on affluence.147 
Marshall used the strict scrutiny standard instead of rationality review.  
Traditionally, rationality applied to state discrimination of economic and 
commercial instances because economic matters were usually far removed from 
constitutional guarantees.148  However, the standard of review used in analyzing 
state discrimination is higher “in light of the constitutional significance of the 
interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification.”149  Based 
on the historical background and marginalization of “discrete, powerless 
minorities” by the financial system, Rodriguez warranted judicial strict scrutiny.150  
Moreover, wealth discrimination cases were mostly attributable to the private 
sector, but this case involved state economic discrimination, which was very 
unusual.  Therefore, careful review was imperative.151 
The plaintiffs’ interest in Rodriguez was “fundamental” because education is a 
fundamental interest recognized by the Court that directly correlates with one’s 
ability to exercise their First Amendment rights and their right to vote.152  Many 
rights are implicitly fundamental even though they are not explicitly written in the 
Constitution.  For instance, the rights to travel interstate and to vote in state 
elections are fundamental rights.153  If state action hindered a fundamental interest 
protected under the Constitution, then the state must show the action is “necessary 
to promote a compelling government interest.”154  Discerning “fundamental” 
interest is difficult, but the closer the interest is to a constitutional guarantee the 
more fundamental it becomes.155  The education of pupils in Texas was 
fundamental and closely related to constitutional guarantees of educational 
opportunity. 
Next, Marshall criticized the majority’s two-pronged classification for wealth 
discrimination.  He illustrated that in Harper, the Court struck down a $1.50 poll 
tax in Virginia because it directly hindered one’s fundamental interest of 
participating in state franchise.  Moreover, the suspect class included those too poor 
to afford the $1.50 and those who failed to pay.156  Additionally, the political 
process was not a pertinent outlet for the disadvantaged because poor districts had 
little voice to influence legislative redress compared to rich districts that favored the 
status quo.157 
Texas’ state interest in maintaining the financial scheme was to preserve local 
 
 147.  Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
 148.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98.  Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 149.  Id. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 123. 
 152.  Id. at 112–15. 
 153.  Id. at 99–100. 
 154.  Id. at 100. 
 155.  Id.at 102–103. 
 156.  Id. at 118. 
 157.  Id. at 123. 
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educational control; but it was not enough to meet the “compelling” standard 
according to Marshall.  Describing it as “ephemeral character,” Marshall recognized 
that local control intended to engage the community in educating its children.158  
The idea that it takes a Village to raise a child was fostered in the local education 
theme.  However, when the financial plan created educational inequalities for 
minorities, the Equal Protection Clause trumped the communal end.159  Marshall 
most likely agreed with Powell in that the mere existence of inequality did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  However, Marshall believed the grave 
inequalities of the financial scheme towards the students in poor districts violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Powell’s commonality argument—that many states 
used similar plans—was not persuasive to Marshall because commonality did not 
prove constitutionality.  According to history, though nearly every State engaged in 
segregation, it was still unconstitutional despite its normalness.  Powell’s sympathy 
for school officials and Marshall’s sympathy for marginalized minorities placed the 
justices on opposite sides of Rodriguez due to their vastly different experiences. 
 
IV. TRANSITIONING FROM INTEGRATION TO EQUALIZATION 
 
Justice Marshall and Justice Powell wrote many opinions that affected the 
realm of education.  As society moved from an era of desegregation to an era of 
rectification, the Court began to grapple with new legal issues.  Using constitutional 
text and valid precedent, the Supreme Court justices sought out to define the 
meaning of “equality” considering the backdrop of past racial discrimination.  In 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,160 the definition of equality began to take 
shape.  One could infer from its holding that legitimate expectations of seniority 
trump integration efforts made by the teachers’ union.  In Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Education, an affirmative action seniority system was implemented to protect 
African American teachers from layoffs.161  Due to the history of racial 
discrimination, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the Jackson 
Board of Education and the Union included a caveat in Article XII which retained 
less-senior minority individuals over more-senior white individuals to ensure “at no 
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the 
current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.”162  
Each year, the employees reconsidered, voted, and approved the CBA. 
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority, rejected the school board’s “role 
model” theory, which claimed racial preferences were justified as a means of 
remedying societal discrimination and providing African American children with 
 
 158.  Id. at 133. 
 159.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 134. 
 160.  476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 161.  Id. at 270. 
 162.  Id. (quoting Art. XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement). 
STEPHENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/14  7:49 PM 
50 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE [Vol. 28 
 
role models.163  The “role model” theory would justify the use of racial preferences 
for eternity and remedies needed to discern a clear stopping point for preferential 
treatment.164  Reliance on historical discrimination was outmoded and the country 
was “long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose” to justify 
racially preferential layoff practices.165  While quoting Swann,”[a]t some point 
these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compliance 
with this Court’s decision in Brown I,” Powell seemed to suggest that the country 
had completed its mission of integration, an overly optimistic and ill-judged 
conclusion.166  He accused the district court and the school board of engaging in the 
unconstitutional act of racial balancing, since “the affirmative duty to desegregate 
ha[d] been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action [was] 
eliminated from the system.”167 
Under strict scrutiny, the majority held that the provision violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the 
State’s goal of remedying societal discrimination.168  The financial and 
psychological effects of layoff were more burdensome than the effects of not being 
hired.169  The timely investment to ensure job security, the legitimate expectations 
that followed from a seniority system, and the dependence on certain wages were 
aspects relied on by union workers.  Powell’s use of psychologically based public 
policy strayed from his usual style and resembled more of Marshall’s style of 
opinion writing revealing Marshall’s influence on Powell’s jurisprudence. 
Marshall’s dissent stressed the importance of viewing race-conscious 
provisions within the context and the facts of the case.  The issue was whether the 
Constitution prohibited a union and school board from laying off minority teachers 
to preserve the effects of the affirmative hiring policy put into place as an 
“affirmative step[] to recruit, hire and promote minority group teachers . . . .”170  
Since layoffs were necessary after two years of implementing the diversity hiring 
policy, enforcing a strict seniority system would lay off all the African American 
teachers and would essentially undo the integration of the teachers’ union.171  While 
the union advocated for the strict seniority system and the school board proposed 
freezing minority layoffs and placing the burden completely on white teachers, the 
two entities compromised by forming Article XII.172 
Using the reasonableness standard to analyze the provision, Marshall felt the 
state’s legitimate goal to “eliminat[e] the pernicious vestiges of past discrimination” 
 
 163. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275–76. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 275. 
 166.  Id. at 275–76. 
 167.  Id. at 276. 
 168.  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280. 
 169.  Id. at 283–84. 
 170.  Id. at 297. 
 171.  Id. at 298. 
 172.  Id. at 298–99. 
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was constitutional.173  Strict scrutiny only applied to cases involving fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications and this case did not encompass either aspect.174  In 
addition, the Court gives a considerable amount of deference to unions in creating 
inventive seniority systems.  In most union cases, the Court exudes “minimal 
supervision” over substantive portions of collective bargaining agreements due to 
the complicated structure of union contracts.175  Addressing Powell’s use of 
psychological effects, Marshall noted that the unfairness associated with layoffs 
should not be confused with the constitutionality of them.176  If a legitimate state 
purpose existed and eighty percent of the white union members reconsidered and 
signed the agreement six times, then the provision is constitutional.177  Lastly, 
Marshall criticized the majority for not providing an alternative solution to Article 
XII.  The provision was the narrowest and most equitable because it enforced a 
seniority system and preserved minority representation simultaneously.178 
In Wygant, Powell adopted certain aspects of Marshall’s jurisprudence and 
Marshall adopted specific characteristics of Powell’s jurisprudence.  Usually, 
Marshall used social science to expand his constitutional arguments.  However, 
Powell used social science to enhance his argument that an employee’s reliance on 
a seniority system trumped the racial preference regime implemented by the 
teachers’ union.  On the other hand, Powell usually advocated for the freedom of 
school officials to act autonomous without court intervention.  However, Marshall 
used the theory of autonomy to justify the union’s actions in Wygant.  Powell 
imposed Court intervention despite the usual deference given to unions and the 
employees’ actively contracting for the inclusion of Article XII.  Each Justice’s 
perspective depended on the interests he sought to protect.  Powell empathized the 
rights “innocent” white tenured workers who relied on job security despite their 
benefit from a historically exclusionary system.  Conversely, Marshall sympathized 
with the black marginalized worker who was hired last due to past discriminatory 
policies and could not obtain the job security given to the white tenured workers 
because the opportunity to join the teachers’ union was not an option for black 
teachers pre-1980. 
The legal issues surrounding affirmative action programs have caused much 
contention in the American courts and continue to be at the forefront of policy 
discussions.  After the fifty-ninth anniversary of Brown, affirmative action 
programs in college admissions have received considerable attention by the courts, 
media, and policy makers.  Unsurprisingly, Justice Powell’s and Justice Marshall’s 
differing opinions on affirmative action as shown in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, revealed interesting insights about their jurisprudence and 
 
 173.  476 U.S. at 301. 
 174.  Id. at 301–302. 
 175.  Id. at 311 (quoting Amer. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76–77 (1982) & Cal. Brewers 
Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980)). 
 176.  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 296. 
 177.  Id. at 299. 
 178.  Id. at 301. 
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experiences.  If the two Justices were still on the bench, what would they say about 
affirmative action in today’s world?  How would they decide Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin? 
 
V. BAKKE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE MODERN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
“It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons 
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater 
than that accorded others.” 
Justice Lewis Powell, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 295 (1978). 
 
“In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the 
lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should 
be a state interest of the highest order.” 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 396 (1978). 
 
Regents of University of California v Bakke,179 a pivotal case in American 
constitutional history, set the precedent for affirmative action college admissions 
programs and shaped the constitutional arguments that would influence the holding 
of many future cases.  In Bakke, the University of California Davis Medical School 
implemented a special admissions program to increase the number of disadvantaged 
students.180  The special admissions program worked concurrently with the regular 
admissions process to determine the students of the incoming class.181 All minority 
applications—African American, Asian American, American Indian, and Mexican 
American—as well as applications marked as economically or educationally 
disadvantaged were sent to the special admissions program.182  Special admissions 
interviewed one out of five applicants and did not require a minimum grade point 
average (“GPA”) or compare the top candidates to the general admissions 
applicants.183  There were no disadvantaged whites admitted under the special 
admissions program but there were significant increases in the admission rates for 
blacks and Mexican Americans as compared to minorities accepted through general 
admissions.184  As a screening mechanism in the regular admissions program, a 2.5 
 
 179.  438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 180.  Id. at 272. 
 181.  Id. at 274–75. 
 182.  Id. at 274. 
 183.  Id. at 275. 
 184.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (The special admissions program accepted twenty one black students, thirty 
Mexican Americans, and twelve Asian Americans; the general admissions program accepted one black 
student, six Mexican American, and thirty-seven Asian American.  Note the acceptance of Asian Americans 
were mostly under the general admission.  The amount of minority general acceptances may have been 
skewed based on the number of minority applicants who applied to the general admissions and those who 
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GPA was required and one out of six applicants were interviewed.  Bakke was 
denied admission twice through the general admissions program though he received 
a high interview score and there were seats open in the special admissions program 
when he was rejected.  Some applicants admitted through the special program had 
lower GPAs, interview scores, and Medical College Admission Test (“MCAT”) 
scores than the plaintiff.185 
The plaintiff challenged the special admissions program because it functioned 
as a racial quota and guaranteed disadvantaged minorities sixteen seats in the 
incoming class.186  Using the strict scrutiny standard, the Court held that the special 
admissions program was unconstitutional because it functioned as an unlawful 
quota system and directed the medical school to admit Bakke.187  Powell 
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause was founded during historically 
troubling times.  However, he expressed that in 1978, a more textual approach 
should be taken to ensure that all persons regardless of race received equal 
protection under the law.188  Therefore, Powell discarded the two-class theory on 
the basis that the country had moved past racial discriminatory times and that it was 
unfair to offer racial preferences to minorities when whites did not receive special 
treatment.189 
To justify the use of a suspect class, the State had to show the purpose was 
constitutional, substantial, and necessary to accomplish the goal.190  The special 
admissions program had four main goals: 1) to reduce the underrepresentation of 
minorities in the medical profession, 2) to counter societal discrimination, 3) to 
increase physicians serving in underserved areas, and 4) to foster ethnic diversity in 
the student body.191  Powell undermined each goal and concluded that it was not 
necessary for a suspect class to receive special treatment at the expense of others.  
The first goal of ameliorating underrepresentation of minorities as imposing a quota 
based solely on race, which was per se unconstitutional.192  The medical school’s 
second goal of countering societal discrimination was nebulous and too broad to 
justify class.193  According to Powell, it “impose[d] disadvantages upon persons 
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of 
 
applied to the special program.  The number of Asian Americans accepted under the general admissions 
program may show that more Asians applied under the general admission and did not consider themselves 
“disadvantaged.”  The Court does not address this phenomenon, but it is interesting to note since statistics can 
often be tailored to frame a point in particular ways.). 
 185.  Id. at 277 (The record did not reflect how many students admitted through general admissions had 
lower scores.). 
 186.  Id. at 279. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 289. 
 189.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-98. 
 190.  Id. at 305. 
 191.  Id. at 306. 
 192.  Id. at 307. 
 193.  Id. 
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the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.”194  The third goal, 
based on the university’s assumption that minority students will practice medicine 
in underserved, predominately minority communities, was not properly supported 
because the medical school did not provide information showing that minority 
students had this goal in mind.195  The lack of evidence and the broad assumption 
was insufficient to justify the suspect class.  Ethnic diversity, the last goal of the 
university, was constitutionally acceptable; however Powell noted that race could 
only be one factor in the admissions process, not the sole deciding factor for 
admitting a student.196  Even though Powell and Marshall agreed that diversity 
could be a factor in the admissions process, Marshall did not completely agree with 
the majority and wrote a separate dissent expressing his arguments for upholding 
the constitutionality of the special admissions program.197 
While Powell used a textualist approach to interpret the Equal Protection 
Clause, Marshall used a historical contextual approach.  Racial discrimination 
against blacks ensued for more than three hundred years in America and the state’s 
interest in rectifying such wrongs and improving the underrepresentation of 
minorities in the medical field was constitutionally valid.198  In the beginning of his 
dissent, Marshall laid out Negro history beginning with slavery.199  The 
proclamation that “all men are created equal” only applied to white men.  Just as the 
British oppressively reigned over the thirteen colonies, whites in America repeated 
history by oppressively reigning over blacks.  Justice Marshall emphasized the 
many cases that enhanced the unfortunate theme of Negro inferiority, especially the 
Civil Rights cases200 and Plessy v. Ferguson.  He quoted Justice Harlan, the sole 
dissenter in Plessy, stating that “separate but equal” really meant “colored citizens 
[were] so inferior and degraded that they [could not] be allowed to sit in public 
coaches occupied by white citizens.”201  Even in 1978, African Americans were not 
equal to their white peers mainly because centuries of unequal treatment were 
ingrained in the American way of life.  The unemployment rate for blacks was 
twice that of whites despite their small population.202  Moreover, Bakke was 
decided a mere twenty-four years after Brown held that integration of all schools 
was necessary.  Twenty-four years was not enough to overturn three hundred and 
fifty years of segregation, so the medical school’s interest of ensuring diversity 
made the special admissions program constitutional. 
Based on legislative intent, Marshall argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 194.  Id. at 310. 
 195.  Id. at 310–11. 
 196.  Id. at 311–12. 
 197.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 198.  Id. at 388–90. 
 199.  Id. at 388. 
 200.  The Civil Rights cases held that Congress lacked authority under the Equal Protection Clause to 
outlaw racial discrimination by private entities. 
 201.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 202.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395. 
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was enacted to grant Negroes a chance to succeed and to remedy the effects of 
discrimination.203  It logically followed that the implementation of race-conscious 
measures may be necessary to ensure equality especially since white resistance was 
still prevalent in society.204  The intent of the Framers was to promote equality 
based on the context of reality, not on an abstract equality grounded in the untrue 
premise that racial divide no longer existed in educational institutions.  In Plessy, 
the Court upheld many race conscious state actions.  Swann held that school boards 
could consider race in assigning school zones and United Jewish Organizations v. 
Carey 205 held that New York’s reapportionment plan, which gave more power to 
Negros and Puerto Ricans in the district, therefore precedent supported the 
constitutionality of the special admissions program based on race.206  These cases 
supported remedial measures for groups who were victims to past discrimination 
despite that effect on “innocent” individuals. 
According to Powell, if the two-class theory prevailed, the Court would have to 
evaluate prejudicial experience of various minorities, but Marshall disagreed.207  
Blacks should not have to prove their suffering because racism’s enduring effects 
still pervaded blacks’ lives.  Even though Marshall sat on the highest court of the 
land, he knew many blacks still attended racially divided schools and received less 
educational opportunities than their white peers.  As a man who personally 
experienced racial discrimination, he knew that community practice did not dictate 
the racial equality granted by law.  Justice Powell iterated that many disadvantaged 
whites in the world did not receive preferential treatment in the same way as 
minorities.  Marshall articulated that the difference between disadvantaged whites 
and minorities was discriminatory history.208  The plight of poor whites was 
detrimental and difficult, however the plight of the poor black or Hispanic 
individual was more detrimental because the minority received even fewer 
opportunities than the disadvantaged white person.  The legacy of unequal 
treatment closed the door to Negro opportunities to hold positions of influence, 
affluence, and prestige.  In conclusion, Marshall found that the Court had come full 
circle: from the detriment of Plessy and the Civil Rights cases to the triumph of 
Brown and affirmative action cases and back to hindering programs implemented to 
ensure the equality of educational opportunities for minorities.209 
Bakke’s influence continues to resonate in modern cases.  It was extensively 
cited to in Grutter v. Bollinger,210 where the Court in a five to four decision held 
that the University of Michigan Law School’s race conscious admission policy was 
constitutional.  Diversity was a compelling state interest improving diverse 
 
 203.  Id. at 398–99. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-97. 
 208.  Id. at 400. 
 209.  Id. at 402. 
 210.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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perspectives, enhanced professionalism in preparing students to interact with 
individuals with different views and fostered civic engagement.211  Currently, the 
Supreme Court is reviewing an affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin,212 which has sparked a plethora of interest and warranted much 
media attention.  Affirmative action cases tend to be very close decisions and 
Fisher will likely follow the trend.  Reflecting on Powell’s and Marshall’s 
jurisprudences, this analysis will predict their opinions in Fisher. 
In Fisher, two white women were denied admissions to the university and they 
challenged the constitutionality of the admissions policy.  The two women alleged 
that they were discriminated based on race and should have been admitted because 
they were more qualified than admitted diverse candidates.213  The Western District 
of Texas granted summary judgment to the university and the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Under strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit held that the race 
conscious admissions policy was constitutional and aided the university’s 
compelling interest to achieve diversity. 
The Texas legislature enacted the race neutral “Top 10% Law,” where the 
University of Texas (“UT”) automatically granted admission to all students in the 
top ten percent of their high school class.214  After the enactment of the statute, the 
2004 freshman class admitted 4.5% African Americans, 16.9% Hispanics, and 
17.9% Asian Americans.215  Even though there was an increase in minority 
representation, ninety percent of small classes—ranging from five to twenty-four 
students—contained only one or zero African Americans, forty-three percent had 
one or zero Hispanic students and forty-six percent had one or zero Asian American 
students.216  In response to this underrepresentation, UT adopted the Personal 
Achievement Index (“PAI”) which took a holistic approach to admissions by 
rewarding students based on scores on two essays, leadership extracurricular 
activities, work experience, community service, socioeconomic status, race, and 
ethnicity.217 
Since the Top 10% Law increased minority enrollment, the appellants argued 
that it created a critical mass and the adoption of the PAI unnecessarily and 
unconstitutionally pursued racial balancing.218  According to Grutter, percentage 
plans that happen to increase diversity cannot replace race-conscious programs 
because the percentage does not assess applicants on an individual basis.219  Even 
 
 211.  Id. at 307. 
 212.  631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 213.  Id. at 217. 
 214.  Id. at 227. 
 215.  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224. 
 216.  Amicus Brief for the United States at 6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 
2011) (No. 09-50822). 
 217.  Amicus Brief for the United States at 4–7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 
2011) (No. 09-50822). 
 218.  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 234. 
 219.  Id. at 239. 
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though the legislature thought this rule would increase minority admissions, the 
percentage plan does not embody the holistic view adopted in Grutter.  Therefore, 
the “Top 10% Law” cannot replace a race conscious program implemented to 
achieve diversity and select people with unique perspectives, different experiences, 
and dynamic backgrounds. 
Appellants also argued that the Top 10% Law reached a critical mass.  
Comparing enrollment numbers of Michigan Law School in Grutter, which ranged 
from 13.5 to 20.1 percent to UT’s admission of forty percent of African Americans, 
Hispanics, and Asian Americans, the appellants claimed that UT exceeded the 
necessity of critical mass.220  The Court rejected this because the appellants used 
the percentage range as a quota in determining critical mass.221  Grutter did not tie 
critical mass to a specific number.  Just as affirmative action programs cannot 
implement quotas that reserve a specified number of minority seats, those 
challenging the programs cannot cap the number of minority seats at a specific 
number.  Moreover, the Court would not allow the plaintiffs to lump together 
minority groups because lumping was held unconstitutional in Parents Involved.222  
Each minority must be analyzed separately to discern whether the university’s 
diversity goals have been achieved.  The Fifth Circuit found that the aggregate 
percentage skewed the existence of diversity because minorities were grouped in 
specific departments, and did not represent a critical mass for the university as a 
whole.223  Appellants claimed the PAI was not narrowly tailored and had a minimal 
effect on diversity substantially reached by the Top 10% Law.  However, the 
Grutter-like system was not impermissible after the exhaustion of race neutral 
alternatives.  Small gains in diversity were not reason enough to ban a race-
conscious program. 
Additionally, the mere fact that appellants had higher grades than diverse 
candidates admitted in the top ten percent of their high school was not cogent.  
Competition was much more intense for those who were not in the top ten percent.  
In 2008, ninety-two percent of Texas residents were admitted under the Top 10% 
Law, therefore non-top ten percent applicants filled the remaining eight percent.224  
Often times, non-top ten applicants have higher SAT scores than automatically 
granted students, regardless of race, to help set them apart from a very large 
applicant pool.225  Consequently, the heavy emphasis placed on the academic 
qualifications of non-top ten applicants adversely affected minority applicants 
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 223.  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 245. 
 224.  Amicus Brief for the United States at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 
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because nationally, they have lower SAT scores than whites.226  Even though the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, it did so with caution, saying that the PAI 
should not be implemented in perpetuity.  Since the Top 10% Law augmented the 
number of Texans admitted—in 1998, the law accounted for forty-one percent of 
Texas admits and in 2008, eighty-one percent of admits—the necessity of using 
race in admission policies may deteriorate based on racial demographics.227  In 
Grutter, Justice O’Connor also addressed the perpetuity issue stating that the race 
conscious admissions program at Michigan’s Law School would be phased out 
within twenty-five years.228 
To predict Powell’s Fisher opinion, the analysis will apply the framework in 
Bakke and apply it to the facts of this case.  Similar to the lower courts, Powell 
would use strict scrutiny to analyze UT’s use of race in its admissions process.  To 
justify the use of a suspect class, the State must show the purpose is constitutional, 
substantial, and necessary to accomplish the goal.  PAI had four main goals: 1) to 
foster ethnic diversity in the student body, 2) to promote cross racial understanding, 
3) to prepare students for the workforce, and 4) to break down stereotypes.229  
Powell would find the first goal of ethnic diversity constitutionally acceptable.  
However, Powell may be skeptical of the second goal of promoting cross-racial 
understanding and the fourth goal of breaking down stereotypes because they are 
nebulous concepts, similar to the goals in Bakke, which purported to counteract 
societal discrimination.  Unlike the university in Bakke, UT does not ground its 
goals in assumptions and on its face, the program seems constitutional because race 
is amongst many factors in making admissions decisions and because there were 
not a specific number of seats set aside for minority students.  In the analysis, 
Powell would have to discern if diverse Texas applicants received special treatment 
at the expense of the plaintiffs in Fisher or if the plaintiffs were mere applicants 
that fell prey to fierce competition.  Since the PAI resembles Grutter’s holistic 
approach, Powell’s deep respect for precedent may lead him to affirm the Fifth 
Circuit.  However, Powell had an overly optimistic view of the progress of race 
relations and by 2013, he may assume that race-conscious programs are no longer 
necessary.  Based on a textual approach, he may reverse the Fifth Circuit because 
the top ten percent is sufficient in admitting minority students.  He would agree 
with O’Connor that the Court must draw a line when considering the 
constitutionality of racial preference. 
The Ghost of Marshall Past would analyze Fisher using the historical context 
and practical realities of modern day racial relations and would hold UT’s program 
constitutional.  If the Court decided the affirmative action program at UT was 
unconstitutional, Marshall would find that the Court had come full circle once 
again: from the detriment of Bakke, to the triumph of Grutter, and back to hindering 
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affirmative action programs still necessary in providing educational opportunities to 
minorities.  If Marshall were still living, he would view practical realities of today 
and conclude that the nation is far from achieving racial equality.  Hate crimes 
remain commonplace in Southern states like Mississippi,230 and Alabama recently 
in 2000 updated its state law to allow interracial marriages.231  In 2011, a church in 
Kentucky would not wed an interracial couple and in 2010, a justice of the peace 
denied a marriage license to an interracial couple.232  It is clear that our society has 
not transitioned completely into racial equality and the idea of black inferiority 
continues to plague the minds of the American people.  The discriminatory history 
of minorities is a driving source of grave race relations and therefore, diversity and 
ensuring education benefits for minorities are still compelling interests that deserve 
protection. 
Marshall would find the perpetuity argument unpersuasive and reject 
O’Connor’s overly optimistic dicta that affirmative action programs will not be 
needed in twenty-five years.  Unfortunately, the modern day African American is 
still viewed as inferior by many Americans.  To reverse nearly three hundred and 
fifty years of racial divide in such a small amount of time is impractical.  Grutter 
occurred forty-nine years after the Brown decision and twenty-five years from the 
Grutter decision is 2028—nearly seventy-five years after the Brown decision and 
merely fifteen years from now.  Marshall would not believe that seventy-five years 
of slow-moving progress could reverse nearly so many years of racial segregation.  





Both Justice Powell and Justice Marshall expressed deep veneration for 
education.  They recognized its ability to unlock the doors of success and expand 
one’s horizons beyond the boundaries of apathy.  Though the Justices influenced 
education in different ways and often had opposing views, their unique 
jurisprudences were essential in moving the ball forward to educational reform.  
According to Powell, American politics relied too much on judges’ ability to decide 
great social issues.233  On a grassroots level, community leaders should determine 
solutions for the problems that plague society, not nine robed judges. 
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Marshall believed the Court was a stimulant in motivating communities to act.  
Litigation was used as a tool to challenge social wrongs when the marginalized 
became complacent with the status quo and when local authorities inadequately 
addressed social ills.  Even though defining equality resembled a game of tug of 
war, the justices presented both sides of the argument diligently and laudably.  To 
much avail, their jurisprudence reflected their background experiences.  Their two 
worlds merged while on the bench and each learned something from the other: the 
Southern white gentleman learned to appreciate the positive change brought by 
judicial decisions and the Southern black gentleman learned to recognize the 
community’s significance in transforming law into action. 
 
